Milton Winn v. William B. Reid : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1957
Milton Winn v. William B. Reid : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Newel G. Daines; L. Delos Daines; Attorneys for Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Winn v. Reid, No. 8575 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2686
1JNIVER5ll '{ UTAH 
OCT311957 
LAW LIBRAR_'G 
In the SupreDie Court 
of the State of Utahy E ri 
.r lL .u~ 
·r [ 0 ~ - '\ 9 51 
MILTON WINN, 
Appellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 8575 
WILLIAM B. REID, 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Newel G. Daines 
L. Delos Daines 
Attorneys for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Preliminary Statement ---------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
Statement of Facts -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 
Findings of the Court______________________________________________________________________ 3 
Points Relied on______________________________________________________________________________ 4 
Argument 
(1) Horseman is not negligent as a matter of law in travel-
ing on the left side of the roadway. ---·-------------------------------- 5 
(2) In riding on the left side of the road pLaintiff was on 
the proper side and not negligent. -------------------------------------- 7 
(3) Assuming plaintiff was negligent, nevertheless such 
negligence was not a proximate cause of his injuries. ________ 10 
Conclusion ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
CASES CITED 
Chatterton v. Pocatello Post, 223 Pac. (2d) 389 ____________________ 12, 13 
Continenta] Bank and Trust Co. v. Stewart, 291 Pac. (2d) 
890, 4 Utah (2d) 228·-------------·------------------------------------------------- 9 
Devine v. Cook, 279 Pac. (2d) 1073, 3 Utah (2d) 134 ____________ 11 
Edgar v. Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 32 Utah 330, 
90 Pac. 745 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------11, 12 
Kessel v. Hunt, 244 NW 714---------------------------------------------------------- 9 
Pixler v. Clemuns, 191 NW 375---------------------------------------------------- 9 
Shellaberger v. Fisher, 143 Fed. 937-------------------------------------------- 12 
Traeger v. Wasson, 163 Ill. App. 572------------------------------------------ 8 
Walker v. Peterson, 278 Pac. (2d) 29L ________________________________ 7, 9, 15 
Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Company, 80 Utah 
331, 15 Pac. (2d) 301, 309·--------------------------------------------------- 8 
TEXTS CITED 
38 Am. Jur. page 695, Sec. 50·------------------------------------------------------- 11 
38 Am. Jur. page 702, Sec. 54·----------------------------------------------------- 12 
Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Blashfield 3 
Permanent Edition, page 50, Sec. 1672; page 48, 
Sec. 1672 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------6, 8 
Elliott on Roads and Streets, Sec. 834---------------------------------------- 6 
STATUTES CITED 
41-6-15, U.C.A. 1953------------------------------------------------------------------------ 6 
41-6-90, U.C.A. 1953 -------------------------------·---------------------------------------- 6 
41-6-117 to 41-6-175, U.C.A. 1953 ... ----·---------------------------------------- 6 
41-6-82, U.C.A. 1953·----------------------------------------------------·------------------ 9 
41-6-53, U.C.A. 1953·-------------------------------------------·--------·------------------ 13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the SupreiDe Court 
of the State of Utah 
MILTON WINN, 
Appellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 8575 
WILLIAM B. REID, 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Honor-
able Lewis Jones, Judge, District Court of Cache County, 
Utah. The action was for personal injuries and damages 
to personality. The court sat without a jury. 
The appellant and respondent were both traveling 
in the nighttime in the same direction, the appellant on 
horseback and the respondent by automobile. The appel-
lant's horse was struck from behind by the respondent's 
automobile while re.spondent was riding along the left 
edge of the road in a northerly direction, facing traffic. 
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2 
In finding for the respondent, the court held appel-
lant should have been traveling on the right side of the 
roadway, that he was negligent as a matter of law in 
riding along the left side of the highway and that such 
negligence was a proximate cause of his damages. (R. 
6, 7) 
The appellant was plaintiff and the respondent the 
defendant in the court below. They will be referred to 
as plaintiff and defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The accident happened on June 21, 1954, within the 
limits of Smithfield, Cache County, Utah, between 1st 
North and Center Streets on 3rd West Street, in the 
nighttime at about 8 o'clock P.:M:. (R.-13, 14). Plaintiff 
was riding a horse and defendant driving an automobile. 
Both were traveling North in the same direction on 3rd 
West Street in the town of Smithfield. The street had 
an oil surface 20 ft. wide with shoulders 4 to 6 ft. on 
each side (R.-13, 14, 16, 24, 36). The plaintiff, on turning 
on to 3rd West Street, traveled along the \Vest edge 
of the oil surface or on the shoulder in a northerly direc-
tion for a distance of about 30 rods when he was struck 
from behind by an .aut01nobile driven by defendant (R. 
11, 16-18, 24, 36, 39-43). The defendant applied his brakes 
and skidded approximately 48 ft. prior to the impact. 
The skid n1arks started about the center of the oil sur-
face and veered to the \Vest so that the left wheels were 
a foot or two east of the edge of the oil surface at the 
point of impact (R. 39-45). The left side of the car 
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was damaged (R. 26, 35-36). Defendant's lights were on 
and there was nothing to obstruct his view and he gave 
no warning of his approach (R. 17, 40). The horse was 
thrown into the bar pit on the West. Its left leg was 
broken and plaintiff ,sustained a broken foot and was 
otherwise injured (R. 17-20). 
From the foregoing facts, the court found the fol-
lowing: 
"That on the 21st day of June, 1955, within 
the corporate limits of Smithfield, Cache County, 
Utah, the plaintiff was riding horseback and at 
the same time the defendant was operating his 
car on the left hand side of the same road, both 
parties proceeding in the s-ame direction. 
"That as the parties moved northward in the 
same direction, the plaintiff caused his horse to 
move from the right hand side of the road to the 
left hand side of the road and had .straightened 
out and proceeded parallel with the road for about 
30 rods when the accident occurred. That the de-
fendant operated his car into and against the rear 
end of the horse, then, there and thereby injuring 
said horse and the plaintiff himself. That the 
vehicle was also damaged. 
"The Court finds that the plaintiff was negli-
gent and that said negligence was a proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injury and damage by reason 
of the fact that the plaintiff directed his animal 
over to the wrong side of the road and along said 
side without just cause or excuse and that no 
signal or warning was given by the plaintiff to 
the defendant as he approached from the plain-
tiff's rear; that the defendant was negligent and 
such negligence was a proximate cause of the 
accident by reason of the fact that the said de-
fendant was then and there operating, without 
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just cause and excuse, his vehicle on the left side 
of the road. The court further finds that the 
accident occurred in the nighttime .and while the 
defendant had his head lights burning and that 
no light was displayed by the plaintiff (R. 6, 7). 
POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT 
WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN TRAVELING 
ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE ROADWAY IN THE FACE 
OF ONCOMING TRAFFIC. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED, IF IT FOUND AS A MATTER OF 
FACT, THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT IN TRAVEL-
ING HORSEBACK ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE ROAD-
WAY IN THE FACE OF ONCOMING TRAFFIC. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING, ASSUMING PLAIN-
TIFF WAS NEGLIGENT IN TRAVEUNG ON THE LEFT 
SIDE OF THE ROADWAY, THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE 
WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES 
AND DAMAGE. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The plaintiff was not negligent as a matter of law 
in traveling on horseback on the left hand side of the 
road in the face of oncoming traffic. 
The court's findings of fact indicates the court was 
of the opinion and it so held that it was the duty of a 
horseman, in the nighttime, to travel on the right hand 
side of the road, his back to traffic, as a matter of law, 
and that in traveling on the left edge of the roadway 
in the face of oncoming traffic he was negligent as a 
matter of law, for in its findings it said: 
"The court finds that the plaintiff was negli-
gent and that said negligence w.as a proximate 
cau.se of plaintiff's injuries and damage by reason 
of the fact that the plaintiff directed his animal 
over to the wrong side of the road and along 
said side without just cause .and excuse." 
Apparently the court was under a misapprehension 
as to the correct rule of law in this respect and that 
accounts for the result reached. 
The common law did not impose a requirement that 
the rider of a horse travel on the right side of the road, 
especially in the nighttime, .and if there is such a require-
ment it would have to be imposed by statute. 
A horseman's and motorist's rights upon the high-
way are equal and reciprocal each being restricted in 
the exercise of his rights by the corresponding rights 
of the other, and the rider of a well broken horse is 
entitled to ride it anywhere on the street that he chooses 
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in the ab.sence of statute. It has been stated by .a learned 
author as follows: 
"The rights of a driver of a horse and the 
driver of a motor vehicle to use the highway are 
equal and reciprocal, each being restricted in the 
exercise of his rights by the current rights of 
the other. Accordingly, the driver of a well broken 
horse is entitled to drive it anywhere in the street 
he may choose, and, when he sees an automobile 
approaching it, it is not negligence to drive close 
to the curb he may choose ... " Cyclopedia of 
Automobile Law and Practice, Blashfield 3 perm-
anent Edition, page 48, Section 1672. And see 
Elliott on Roads and Streets, Section 834. 
We have been unable to find where any courts have 
laid down a rule that a horsen1an must travel on the 
right facing traffic or a 1natter of law and the statutes 
of this State do not. Our statutes are silent on the matter, 
merely saying: 
"Every person riding an animal or driving 
any animal-drawn vehicle upon a roadway shall 
be subject to the provisions of the Act applicable 
to the driver of a vehicle, except those provisions 
of the Act which by their nature can have no ap-
plication." 41-6-15, F.C.A. 1953. 
The only vehicles the statutes enjoin to travel on 
the right side of the road are those that can be equipped 
with rear-end warning lights and reflectors, such .as bi-
cycles, automobiles, tractors, etc. ( 41-6-90, 41-6-117 to -!1-
6-175, U.C.A. 1953) and as a horseman cannot as a 
practical matter be equipped with either tail lights or 
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reflectors, it would be illogical to say that the statutes 
requiring vehicles to travel on the right side of the road 
in the nighttime are applicable to him. 
As the court was under a misunderstanding, be-
lieving that .a horseinan was required as a matter of law 
to travel on the right side of the road with his back to 
traffic, it undoubtedly misapplied the law and reached 
the result it would not have done if it had correctly 
understood the correct rule, and for this reason the 
plaintiff is entitled to a new trial unless the court 
should hold the plaintiff was riding on the proper side 
of the road, not negligent, or if negligent, it was not a 
proximate cause of his injuries, in which event we submit 
that it should direct the trial court to enter judgment 
for the plaintiff. This latter position, we believe, is the 
one the court should take. 
Walker vs. Peterson, 278 Pac. (2nd) 291, 
3 Utah (2d) 54. 
Point II 
In riding on the left side of the road plaintiff was 
on the proper side of the road and not negligent. 
As we have pointed out, our statutes are silent as 
to which side of the road .a horseman should travel, 
especially while traveling in the nighttime; thus the rule 
of equal rights applies. Under this rule, nighttime or 
daytime, as long as he surrenders one-half of the road, 
either left or right, to the driver of an automobile, he is 
not negligent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
"Under the rule that a horse1nan's and a 
rnotorist's rights upon the highway are equal, the 
rider of .a horse who is approached from the rear 
by a motorist has a right to continue to use at 
least one-half of the beaten track, and, if he sur-
renders the right ~ide of the beaten track for the 
use of the motorist, that is all that he is required 
to do. The fact that the parties are going in the 
same direction instead of in opposite directions 
imposes no greater obligation upon the horseback 
rider to leave the beaten track, is not guilty of 
contributory negligence by traveling on the left 
side of such beaten track." (Italics added.) 
Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice; 
Blashfield 3 Permanent Edition, page 50, Sec. 
1672; 
Traeger vs. Wasson, 163 ill. App. 572. 
A horse1nan has as n1uch right to the use of the 
roadways as any other traveler, and this court has held 
that as it is ilnpossible to equip a horse with taillights 
it is not necessary for hiln to do so. This court in Dalley 
vs. Mid-Western Dairy Products Company, 80 rtah 331, 
15 Pac. (2nd) 309, said: 
•· ... He knew he was traveling upon a high-
way that was used by pedestrians, and persons 
traveling on horseback and in horse-drawn -re-
hicles, none of whon1 are required to disclose a 
light to warn others of their pre.sence upon the 
highway." 
~hould thi~ <'ourt, hmn'Yer. not be inclined to follow 
thP doctrine of equal right~. preferring the reasonable, 
prudent mnn tP~t. we neYPrthele~~ urge that the plaintiff, 
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in riding on the left in the face of oncoming traffic, waH 
not negligent and that as to this the minds of reasonable 
men cannot differ, and if this be true, the court should 
direct the trial court to enter judginent in favor of the 
plaintiff and fix the amount of judgment. 
Walker vs. Peterson, 278 Pac. (2nd) 291, 3 
Utah (2nd) 54, supra; 
Continental Bank and Trust Company vs. 
Stewart, 291 Pac. (2nd) 890, 4 Utah (2nd) 
228. 
Where else should the plaintiff have been riding 
in the nighttiine? To hold that .a reasonable, prudent per-
son would ride on the right in the front of traffic is 
to say that such a person would deliberately expose him-
self to danger, for a rider on the right encounters more 
danger from the rear than frmn the front and a horse-
man on the left encounters nwre danger from the front 
than frmn the rear, and facing the danger to the front 
he is in a position to take steps to protect himself and 
to avoid colliding with users of the road. 
Kessel vs. Hunt, 244 N.W. 714; 
Pixler vs. C.lemuns, 191 NW 375. 
There is an analogy between a pedestrian .and a 
horseman using the highway. The statute requires a 
pedestrian to~ whenever practical, walk on the left in the 
face of oncoming traffic. ( 41-6-82, U .C .A. 1953). Why 
should this not be the rule as to a horseman? The same 
re.ason:-; are present, nmnely that as neither can, as a 
practical matter, be equipped with warning lights andre-
flectors, he is in less danger in facing oncoming traffic 
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on the left than he would be in having traffic approach 
him from the rear on the right, and while on the left 
he is in a position to see approaching traffic and take 
steps to prevent colliding with oncoming traffic. 
In the light of the court's finding that plaintiff had 
"moved frorn the right side of the road to the left side 
of the road and had straightened out and proceeded 
parallel with the road for about 30 rods before the 
accident occurred," we urge that he was not only traveling 
on the proper side and not negligent and that as to this 
the minds of reasonable men cannot differ. 
In the event this Court believes under its common 
law making powers that it should lay down a rule regard-
ing where a horseman should travel in the nighttime 
whenever practicable, neither adopting the equal rights 
doctrine or the reasonable man test, for the guidance of 
travelers, we submit that under the present traffic condi-
tions that logic and common sense would require that 
it adopt the rule the legislature has adopted pertaining 
to pedestrians, namely that whenever practicable he shall 
travel on the left .side of the road. 
Point III 
Assuming plaintiff was negligent, ne1.:ertheless suclz 
negligence wa.s not a proximate cause of his injuries. 
The eourt having found that plaintiff had traveled 
parallel approxi1nately 30 rods on the left side of the 
street when struck from the rear by defendant's auto-
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mobile, it is our position that plaintiff's riding on the 
left side of the road could not be a proximate cause of his 
injuries, the sole cause being defendant's negligence. 
It is well settled that for plaintiff's negligence to 
bar recovery, it must be a proximate cause of his injuries 
and that the sa1ne rules apply in determining the proxi-
mate cause in contributory negligence as in the negli-
gence of the defendant. Devine vs. Cook, 279 Pac. (2nd) 
1073, 3 Utah (2nd) 134. 
lS: 
The most widely used definition of proximate c.ause 
"The proximate c.ause of an injury is that 
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, pro-
duces the injury and without which the result 
would not have occurred.'' 
38 Am. Jur. page 695, Sec. 50. 
And thi.s court has said that causes which are merely 
incidental to a superior or controlling agency are not 
efficient causes or proximate causes. 
"The proximate cause is the efficient cause, 
the one that necessarily sets the other causes in 
operation. The causes that are merely instru-
ment.al to a superior or controlling agency are not 
the proximate cause and the responsible one." 
Edgar vs. Rio Grande Western Railroad Com-
pany, 32 Utah 330, 90 Pac. 475. 
There must not only be an efficient cause but negli-
gence which furnishes the condition or an occasion upon 
which the injuries .are received is not a proximate cause. 
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"Negligence which merely furnishes the con-
dition or occasion upon which injuries are re-
ceived but does not put in motion the agency by 
which the injuries are inflicted is not the proxi-
mate cause thereof." 
38 Am. Jur. Sec. 54, page 702; 
Chatterton vs. Pocate.llo Post, 223 P.ac. (2nd) 
389. 
And the injuries must have been reasonably foreseen 
or anticipated for an act of negligence to be a proximate 
cause. 
" ... It is generally held that in order to war-
rant a finding that negligence, or an act not 
amounting to a wanton wrong, is the proximate 
cause of the injury, it must appear that the injury 
was the natural and probable consequence of the 
negligence or wrongful act and that it ought to 
have been foreseen in the light of attending cir-
cumstances." 
Edgar vs. Rio Grande Western Railroad Com-
pany, 32 Utah 330, 90 Pac. 7 45, Supra. 
And Judge Sanborn of the 8th Circuit in a well 
reasoned case said : 
"An injury that is a natural and probable 
consequence of an act of negligence is actionable, 
and such an art is the proximate cause of the in-
jury. But an injury which could not have been 
foreseen or reasonably anticipated as the probable 1 
result of an act of negligence is not the proximate 
cause of it." 
Shellaberger vs. Fisher .. 143 Fed. 937. 
From the eourt's finding, although it did not speci- 1 
fically f'ay, it is apparent that the defendant was negli-
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gent in at least three particulars: (1) Failure to keep 
a proper lookout, (2) failure to keep his car under proper 
control, and ( 3) driving on the wrong side of the road. 
(-l:l-6-53, F.C.A. 1953). As to the latter the court found: 
"That the said defendant was then and there 
operating, without ju.st cause or excuse, his vehicle 
on the left side of the road" (R-6). 
These acts were the sole cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
The plaintiff's negligence, if any, on being on the 
left side of the ro.ad was at most a remote cause. By 
being there he 1nerely furnished the condition or occasion 
upon which the defendant's act of negligence acted. 
Had the defendant kept a proper lookout, his car under 
control, and had he driven on the right side of the road 
there would have been no collision. 
Plaintiff being on the left side of the road did not 
put in motion the agency which inflicted the injury for 
that agency w.as the defendant. In every respect the 
efficient cause was the acts of the defendant. The de-
fendant directed the force, the agency that caused the 
damage. Had he not released this force, there would 
have been no injury. How could the plaintiff, traveling 
in the same direction .and being struck from behind, be a 
controlling agency~ How could he have put in motion 
an agency hy which his injuries were inflicted~ The 
plaintiff being there merely furnished the condition or 
occasion to be acted upon. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho in Chatterton vs. Poca-
tello Post, supra, said: 
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". . . that negligence which merely furnishes 
the condition or occasion upon which injuries 
are received but does not put in motion the agency 
by which the injury is inflicted is not the proxi-
mate cause thereof." 
And in applying the final test of whether or not 
the plaintiff could reasonably foresee that his negligence, 
if any, would result in injury, we ask how could he have 
reasonably anticipated that he would have been struck 
by an automobile while he was traveling on the left side 
of the road either from the front or from behind? 
Would it not be reasonably anticipated that as to vehicles 
coming from the front and on their proper side of the 
road, he could see them and act for his safety and that 
as to vehicles coming from the rear they would travel 
on the right hand side of the road, as enjoined by 
statute? 
The plaintiff would no more anticipate the approach 
of an automobile from behind on the side of the street 
which the autonwbile was not expected to use than would 
a pedestrian. And if this court should say that a pedes-
trian should anticipate that injuries would result from 
an .auton1obile striking from behind while walking on the 
left side of the road facing oncoming traffic, then a 
pedestrian would not be free of negligence and his negli-
gence would be a proxhnate cause of his injuries, notwith-
standing that he was enjoined by statute to walk on the 
left side of the road facing oncmning traffic. 
We .agree that ordinarily the question of proximate 
cause is a 1natter of fact for the detennination of the 
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jury or the court, as the case may be. However, when~ 
reasonable minds cannot differ, then it becomes a matter 
of law for this court to determine, and should it determine 
as a n1atter of law that plaintiff's negligence, if any, did 
not contribute to the collision, then the trial court should 
be directed to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
and fix the damages. 
Walker vs. Peterson, 278 Pac. (2nd) 291, 3 
Utah (2nd) 54. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, plaintiff submits : 
(1) That a horseman is not required, as a matter of 
law, to travel in the nightime on the right side of a road-
way. 
(2) That the plaintiff was not negligent in riding on 
the left hand side of the road, for under the doctrine 
of equal rights he had an equal right to use the road with 
the defendant and that when he chose to use the left hand 
side of the road, leaving the right side clear for the 
defendant, he was within his rights, and as to this the 
minds of reasonable men cannot differ. 
(3) That in any event, a reasonable and prudent 
man under like conditions would have ridden where he 
did, and as to this the minds of reasonable men cannot 
differ. 
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( 4) That his negligence, if any, could not have been a 
proximate cause of his injuries, and as to this the minds 
of reasonable men cannot differ. 
That this court should direct the trial court to enter 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the de-
fendant, fixing the damages, or in the alternate, direct 
a new trial inasmuch as the trial court was under a 
misunderstanding in believing that plaintiff was required, 
as a matter of law, to travel on the right side of the road. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEWEL G. DAINES 
Logan, Utah 
L. DELOS DAINES 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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